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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I defend an interpretation of Kant’s Singularity Thesis: the claim that the
formulae of the Categorical Imperative are in fact representations of a single, underlying law. I
proceed by answering two questions: (1) How should we state the underlying law? And (2) How
can we best understand the relationship between the formulae and this law they supposedly
represent? My account focuses on the concept of rational agency and how Kant develops it in
the Groundwork. I will argue that the formulae are three ways of expressing, thinking about, or
applying the Categorical Imperative — understood as Kant’s statement of the supreme principle
of morality — corresponding to three features of rational agency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Kant’s task in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is to explain the concept of
moral obligation, which he defines as “the necessity of a free action under a categorical
imperative” (MS 6:222). Obligation (Verbindlichkeit) expresses the “moral ought”: the idea that
a free, rational agent can be bound to act in a certain way.1 For Kant, all obligation is grounded
in duty: the representation of an action as necessary by virtue of its conformity to a rational law.
In the Groundwork, Kant identifies and corroborates of the “supreme principle of morality”: that
rational law underlying all moral obligation, and the first principle of an a priori investigation of
morality (what Kant calls a “metaphysics of morals”) (GMS 4:392). What he arrives at, the
Categorical Imperative, is the backbone of his ethics and one of the most important
developments in moral philosophy. It expresses basic requirement for a principle to be
obligating for a rational agent — for a principle to function as a moral law.
In the second section of the Groundwork, Groundwork II, Kant derives three further
principles — what he calls the “formulae” of the Categorical Imperative: the Formula of
Universal Law, FUL (GMS 4:421); the Formula of Humanity, FH (GMS 4:429); and the Formula
of Autonomy, FA (GMS 4:434).2 These three laws are supposedly only three ways of
representing a single law. However, they seem to say fundamentally different things: crudely,
“Have universalizable principles!”; “Respect human beings!”; and “Be autonomous!”. It is a job
of interpreters, then, to reconstruct Kant’s answer to the question: what is the relationship
1

Binden in German is literally “to bind”.
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Kant’s readers do not agree on the exact number of formulae, and my selection of three excludes at least two
(the Formulae of the Law of Nature and the Formula of the Realm of Kingdom of Ends). My reasons for doing so
are beyond the scope of this project. While restricting my analysis to these three formulae does sacrifice
thoroughness, it should not sacrifice accuracy within its limited scope.
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between these formulae and the Categorical Imperative they are supposed to express? I take up
this task in this paper.

II. THE SINGULARITY THESIS
In this section, I will do three things: (1) present the claim I am analyzing, (2) discuss the
problem I aim to address, and (3) forecast my solution.
A. TWO THESES
Kant’s own statement of the relationship between the formulae is notoriously difficult to
interpret.3 Later in Groundwork II, after deriving the formulae, he writes: “the above three ways
of representing the principle of morality [the formulae given above] are at the bottom only so
many formulae of the very same law, and any one of them of itself unites the other two in it”
(GMS 4:436). This passage is notoriously opaque. First, Kant seems to describe the relationship
between the formulae and the Categorical Imperative in two ways: as “representations” of the
principle of morality, and as “only so many formulae” of the “very same law.” Second, he
introduces the concept of “unity” to describe what appears to be a different relationship —
specifically, the relationship between the formulae themselves. Finally, and most
problematically, he does not seem to substantiate the aforementioned concepts. We must, then,
elucidate the claims he makes here.
We can begin by dissecting the sentence along its logical form — by considering each
conjunct individually: “the above three ways of representing the principle of morality are at the
bottom only so many formulae of the very same law” and “any one of them of itself unites the
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The difficulty in interpreting this particular passage, and the related difficulty of explicating the relationship
between the formulae and the categorical imperative, has noted by many scholars. Some statements of this and
attempts at resolving it can be found in Timmermann (2007), pp. 109-110; Geiger (2015); Arvan (2013); and Nuyen
(1993).
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other two in it.” Following Henry Allison, I propose we proceed by considering these as two
distinct theses:4
The Equivalence Thesis: “Any one of them [the formulae] unites the other two in it”
The Singularity Thesis: “The above three ways of representing the principle of morality
are at the bottom only so many formulae of the very same law”

The Equivalence Thesis describes the relationship among the formulae themselves. Roughly, it
is the claim that the various formulae determine our moral obligation in the same way — that the
application of any one formula in moral appraisal will yield judgements which are replicable by
the others (and, in this sense, “unite” them in it).5 The Singularity Thesis describes the
relationship between the formulae and the underlying law (the Categorical Imperative, of which
they are formulae). It claims, in brief, that the formulae are three ways of expressing what is
really a single law. While three “singular” laws would inevitably produce the same results, the
converse does not hold. Thus, while the Singularity Thesis would entail the Equivalence Thesis,
the Equivalence Thesis would in no way entail the Singularity Thesis.
While there are many treatments of the Equivalence Thesis found in the literature, the
Singularity Thesis is more often overlooked. There are several possible explanations for this.
Some readers seem to take equivalence to be either identical to or explanatory of singularity. 6
Other readers reject Allison’s contention that the passage makes two distinct claims.7 Allen

4

Allison 2011, 246.
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The literature on the Equivalence Thesis is rich, and there are in fact many ways of interpreting it. A simple
“convergence of duties” interpretation is presented, provisionally, for the purpose of this discussion.
6

Engstrom (2009) and O’Neil (2014) seem to endorse such a view.
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Timmermann (2007) argues for this.
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Wood acknowledges a fundamental difference between equivalence and singularity,8 yet still
ultimately claims that the formulae form a system of “heterogeneous parts.”9 Still more readers
seem to simply assume it without giving it critical attention. I do not propose, in this paper, to
offer a defense of the Singularity Thesis. What I do propose, however, is that we work to
understand what exactly the Singularity Thesis entails. How can we best interpret the claim that
the formulae are singular — three ways of expressing one law? This project may be seen as
subservient to a future defense of the Singularity Thesis; we cannot, after all, convincingly
defend a position we have failed to understand. At the very least, however, this investigation can
help us explain several potentially difficult (and crucially important) elements of Kant’s moral
philosophy: the concept of a law's “formula”, the tension between the multiplicity of formulae
and his repeated insistence that there is only a single moral law, and the distinction he draws
between “subjectively practical” and “objectively practical” differences in moral principles.
In this paper, I will propose an interpretation of the Singularity Thesis. This task
involves several textual and philosophical challenges. The most obvious problem is that the
formulae seem to express three disparate principles. Consider FUL and FH for example. FUL is
a purely formal constraint on action; it determines only the minimum standard for what can
count as a moral maxim (an action-guiding principle or policy of conduct). The maxim “I will
make a promise without keeping it” is ruled out by FUL because the form of the principle is
inadequate; it cannot be universalized without rendering its own concepts absurd.10 FUL does

8

Wood (2008) argues does not itself imply Equivalence. He writes, “That [the quote] implies that they are not
inconsistent with one another, but it does not preclude differences in content between them. Two or more nonequivalent assertions might be taken as statements of the very same proposition” (pp. 81).
9

Wood (2008), 80.
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This is normally couched in terms of contradiction. There are several accounts, however, of what precisely this
contradiction entails. On one account, the universalized principle renders its concepts logically impossible. On
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not, however, tell us anything about what should be valued or pursued in our actions. FH, on the
other hand, places a substantive constraint on action; it sets a “supreme limiting condition” on
the ends I pursue and the means by which I pursue them. The maxim “I will steal from my
neighbor to benefit my family” is ruled out by FH because it proposes to use another human
being for the furtherance of my interests; it uses a human as a “mere mean.” While FH seems to
propose something we should aim to achieve — something that should have value for us — FUL
tells us only what our principles should “look like.” Some, on the basis of this, argue that FUL is
a merely empty principle; since it does not posit a thing to value, it cannot really determine us to
act or set our moral obligations. This fundamental difference between FUL and FH is primarily
responsible for the immediate impression that these laws cannot possibly be reducible to one.
The Singularity Thesis, however, claims that this is the case — that despite their apparent
incompatibility, FUL and FH (and FA) are really just expressions of a single law. The task of
substantiating the Singularity Thesis is crucial to ameliorating this deep tension in Kant’s ethics
and, by extension, to understanding the foundation of his moral system.
B. TWO ACCOUNTS
My account of the Singularity Thesis answers two questions: (1) What is the “very same
law” the formulae supposedly represent? And (2) how can we best understand the relationship
between it and the three aforementioned formulae? Given the claims Kant makes in the
Groundwork, the underlying law must be the Categorical Imperative. What we need to identify,
then, is a general formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Kant’s various statements of the
moral law in Groundwork II all come as formulae: different ways of stating or representing it.
But, according to the Singularity Thesis, these formulae are in fact undergirded by a single law.

another account, the universalized principle renders itself practically impossible — that, in the universalized
scenario, the proposed means are necessarily unfit to serve their intended purpose.
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This law, then, is the “unformulated” Categorical Imperative. I will argue, as an answer to (1),
that we ought to identify the Categorical Imperative with the supreme principle of morality as
Kant states it in Groundwork I: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will
that my maxim should become a universal law” (GMS 4:402). Attentive readers will notice that
this principle is nearly identical to FUL; I will attempt to explain why this is the case and, by
extension, why this should not be seen as a problem. I will approach the second question by
analyzing the argumentative structure of Groundwork II. In particular, I will focus on the role
played by the concept of rational agency in that argument. I will propose, as an answer to (2),
that we can best understand the formulae as applications of the Categorical Imperative to three
distinct aspects of rational agency. Having done this, I will propose an interpretation of the
Singularity Thesis: an explanation of the sense in which these three seemingly disparate
principles are, in fact, singular.
After presenting my account, I will consider Henry Allison’s Analogical Account of the
Singularity Thesis. Allison claims that the singularity of the formulae is explained by their being
representations of a selfsame law — the Categorical Imperative — through the employment of
three different analogies. Like my own account, the Analogical Account is keenly sensitive to
the structure of Groundwork II and emphasizes the role of rational agency in Kant’s derivation of
the formula. I will identify two respects in which my account represents an improvement over
Allison’s. First, my account clearly identifies the principle which serves as the underlying law;
and second, my account provides a clear and textually-based description of the relationship
between the formulae and the underlying law (essentially a characterization of the concept of a
“formula”) while his does not.

6

III. THE “VERY SAME LAW”
Kant claims that the formulae all express the “very same law.” In this section, I will pose
and answer question (1): What, exactly, is that law?
A. THE PROBLEM
The task of this section is to identify the “very same law” which the formulae represent.
It may not be immediately obvious, however, why this is a problem at all. Kant begins this line
of argument (his derivation of the formulae) by clearly setting his agenda: “in this task we want
first to inquire whether the mere concept of a categorical imperative may not also provide its
formula containing the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative” (GMS 4:420,
emphasis mine). One may argue, then, that the ground of the formulae is the mere concept of a
categorical imperative. By this understanding, FUL, FH, and FA would be formulae of the same
law in the sense that they each satisfy Kant’s criteria for a principle to be a law: universal
applicability (GMS 4:421).
There are two significant problems with this account. First, this identification of the
underlying law produces a woefully unsatisfying notion of singularity. On this account, the
various formulae are singular because their form is consistent with Kant’s characterization of a
law — not because they are three statements of one law. To help illustrate this notion of
singularity, consider the following example. Any constitutional government is undergirded by a
set of edicts which determine the minimum requirements for something to qualify as a law.
Imagine one such society with the three following laws: It is forbidden to steal from others, It is
forbidden to do bodily harm to non-human animals, and It is forbidden drive any vehicle without
orange tires. All three laws conform to the state’s constitution, so they must fulfill the
requirements (substantive and procedural) it deems necessary for lawhood. These laws, then, are
singular in the same way that the aforementioned account takes Kant’s formulae to be singular.
7

One should notice a problem: while the hypothetical laws all meet the baseline requirement for
lawhood, their content is entirely disparate. Each law sets a particular obligation, and no two
obligations are related; the laws form a system of obligations, but this system is derivable only
by considering the set of token laws in its entirety. This cannot be how Kant intends the
formulae to be singular. To see why, consider the explicit project of the Groundwork: to make
possible a metaphysics of morals or, as Kant writes, a philosophical investigation “simply from a
priori principles” (GMS 4:388). Kant’s goal in the Groundwork is to identify these foundational
principles in preparation for a systematic and thorough investigation of morality. Early in the
Groundwork, however, he narrows his search from a priori principles to “the supreme principle
of morality” (GMS 4:392). Thus, what Kant is after is a single principle on which the mere
concept of moral obligation can be grounded. This is the spirit in which he makes such claims
as: “there is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative” (GMS 4:421). He means to say, in
the strongest sense possible, that there is one foundational moral law; any additional law (the
formulae, specifically) must be mere expressions of it. It is this robust notion of singularity that
the consistency and success of Kant’s project depends on. The version supported by the account
in question is incapable of meeting this requirement.
Second, the identification of “the very same law” with the concept of a law is textually
inconsistent. The claim that the formulae are representations of the same law is distinct from the
claim that the formulae are equally consistent with Kant’s characterization of a moral law. The
former concept seems to obviously imply the latter; if the formulae can be shown to be
expressions of a selfsame law, then they must also satisfy the conceptual requirement of a law.
The latter concept, on the other hand, does not the former. Moreover, Kant defines a law as a
command that carries universal necessity (GMS 4:416). “All citizens are forbidden from
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engaging in unsanctioned boxing matches” is a law because it: (1) commands that people
perform an action, (2) represents the action as necessary, and (3) applies equally to all people
under the purview of law (this law applies to the citizens of a state, whereas the moral law would
apply to all humans or rational beings). “A categorical imperative is a proposition which
represents an action as necessary irrespective of agent-specific conditions” defines a law, but
cannot itself be a law, since it clearly fails to meet conditions (1), (2), and (3). Thus, there is
strong textual reason to reject the account in question.
B. THE SOLUTION
I move, now, to my identification of the underlying law. While this law must be “the
Categorical Imperative,” my goal is to represent it as “unformulated” — as the law underlying its
formulae. It may be helpful here to recall the place of the Categorical Imperative in the
Groundwork and in Kant’s moral philosophy as a whole. The Groundwork is, first and foremost,
a book about obligation. The Categorical Imperative expresses the most basic requirements for a
principle to be obligating — to be moral laws. In its crudest form, it is simply the command that
a person’s actions be universalizable. Since obligation refers in its definition to rational agency,
any moral law must apply to all rational agents. Any moral law must be universally binding. It
is important, when considering the formulae of the Categorical Imperative, to remember what it
is the formulae are supposed to. If we take them, for instance, to precisely and thoroughly
determine the set of “right actions,” then we risk misunderstanding Kant’s ethics at its most
fundamental level.
To identify the general formulation of the Categorical Imperative, we must begin with
the concept of a categorical imperative that Kant develops at the beginning of Groundwork II.
He defines a categorical imperative as, “that which [represents] an action as objectively
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necessary itself, without reference to another end” (GMS 4:414). The beginning clause, “that
which represents an action as objectively necessary,” is Kant’s definition of an imperative: a
principle which determines the will by “necessitating” it — imposing upon it a rule which must
be followed. “Children ought to drink milk if they want to grow healthy bones” is an imperative;
it represents an action, drinking milk, as something children must do if they fit a certain
description (set “growing healthy bones” as an end — something they want to achieve). If we
accept the antecedent end (growing healthy bones), then the means to it (drinking milk) are
necessitating.11 The second clause of the definition of a categorical imperative, “itself, without
reference to an end,” distinguishes it from the general concept of an imperative. Specifically, it
removes the reference to an end in the representation of the necessity of an action. In the
previous example, the command was conditional; the principle only applied to those people who
accept that healthy bone development is something of value. Categorical imperatives necessitate
the will unconditionally, referencing only the lawfulness of the proposition itself. “One ought
not lie,” a classic example of a categorical imperative, commands that we not lie; this does not
depend on whether we want to lie or whether we accept honesty as something with intrinsic
value.
The concept of a categorical imperative is inextricably linked to the concept of duty.
Kant defines duty as, “the necessity of an action from respect for law” (GMS 4:400).
Importantly, this specifically excludes actions whose necessity is attributable to agent-specific
facts. As he writes in a later passage: “this duty — as duty in general — lies, prior to all
experience, in the idea of a reason determining the will by means of a priori grounds” (GMS
11

Kant claims that If we presuppose the pursuit of a certain end, then we must assume the pursuit of the means to
that end. Thus, a principle which commands the means to an end is analytic, and its prescription is represented as
necessary.
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4:408). Thus, when we act from duty, we act according to and from12 an a priori principle — one
which makes no reference to empirical conditions. Categorical imperatives are “moral
imperatives” because they ground our duties; since they make no reference to an end
independent of the command itself, they are wholly a priori.
Duty connects the Categorical Imperative to the supreme principle of morality which
Kant identifies in Groundwork I. In Groundwork I, Kant introduces the concept of “moral
worth,” a qualitatively unique value an action has when it is done from the moral law. He
describes the origin of moral worth thusly: “For, the will stands between its a priori principle,
which is formal, and its a posteriori incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads: and since it
must still be determined by something, it must be determined by the formal principle of volition
as such when an action is done from duty” (GMS 4:400). The moral character of human action,
then, is grounded in principles of volition: the maxims one sets oneself and acts upon. In
particular, morality is grounded in a priori principles adopted from duty. And, since duty can
only be expressed by categorical imperatives, morality must be grounded in a priori principles in
the form of categorical imperatives (GMS 4:416). Recall, now, the goal of the Groundwork: to
identify the supreme principle of morality for an a priori investigation of morality. If, as I have
shown, morality is grounded in the a priori principles expressed by categorical imperatives, then
the supreme principle of morality must itself be a categorical imperative. And, since “there
is...only a single categorical imperative,” the supreme principle of morality must in fact be the
Categorical Imperative (GMS 4:421). We can express the Categorical Imperative, then, as the

12

To act from duty is to act with duty as the explicit motivating ground. When we eat to assuage hunger, we act
from our desire to satiate ourselves.
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statement Kant identifies as the supreme principle: “I ought never to act except in such a way
that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (GMS 4:402).
The identification of the Categorical Imperative with the supreme principle is
corroborated by strong textual evidence from the Groundwork and Kant’s Critique of Practical
Reason. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant analyzes pure practical reason: the rational
faculty responsible for the representation of and motivation by principles of action. Pure
practical reason is distinguishable from practical reason simpliciter by its exclusion of empirical
conditions; it is the faculty determinable by the moral law alone (KpV 5:30). Just as he provides
a supreme principle at the foundation of a metaphysics of morals, he identifies what he calls the
Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason: the law which determines the activity of this “moral
faculty”. He phrases the law thusly: “so act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the
same time as a principle in a giving of universal law” (KpV 5:30). This law, consistent with
Kant’s characterization of categorical imperatives, is defined by its lack of reference to nonmoral concerns. And, like the supreme principle of morality, it is meant to express the basic a
priori principle governing the will. It should be no surprise, then, that these three principles (the
supreme principle of morality, the Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason, and the
Categorical Imperative) should be essentially identical. This equivalence is further supported by
Kant’s characterization of the absolutely good will, about which he writes: “this principle is,
accordingly, also its supreme law: act always on that maxim whose universality as a law you can
at the same time will...and such an imperative is categorical [emphasis mine]” (GMS 4:437).
One will notice that this is yet another presentation of the supreme principle. And, like the
Fundamental Law, Kant proposes it as a law governing the practical rational faculty — the will.
Finally, and most importantly for our present discussion, he explicitly identifies this principle as
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categorical; if I am correct, this is meant not as merely an instance of a categorical imperative,
but rather as a statement of the Categorical Imperative.
We have strong textual reasons, then, to identify the singular law — the law underlying
the various formulae of the Categorical Imperative — as the supreme principle of morality: “I
ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a
universal law” (GMS 4:402). One pressing objection to this interpretation is that, on this reading,
FUL seems to be identical with the law it is supposedly a formula of. Kant states FUL thusly:
“act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
become a universal law” (GMS 4:421). If we accept the identification of the Categorical
Imperative with the supreme principle, then FUL seems to be a mere restatement of the law it is
supposed to be a formula of. To fend off this challenge, we must either a) deny that FUL is
really a formula of itself, or b) accept that FUL is a formula of itself, and explain this in such a
way as to make this unproblematic — or perhaps inevitable. I believe that the latter approach is
appropriate. However, since my analysis in the next section will should provide the resources to
answer this question, I will postpone addressing it until later.

IV. THE FORMULAE AND THEIR SINGULARITY
In this section, I will argue for an account of the relationship between the formulae and
the Categorical Imperative — an answer to question (2). Having done so, I will present my best
attempt at a clear and thorough statement of the Singularity Thesis. The best approach, I contend,
to understanding this relationship is an analysis of Kant’s derivation of them; if we can come to a
clear picture of how Kant comes to state the formulae, we should be able to construct a clear
picture of what their place is in the developing system. Thus, my strategy in this section will be
to carefully analyze the argumentation of Groundwork II.
13

A. KANT’S DERIVATION OF THE FORMULAE
The most logical place to begin is with the concept of a rational agent. Kant develops
this concept across Groundwork II, and this development is centrally important to his
development of the Categorical Imperative (the derivation of its formulae). Right at the outset of
this line of argument, Kant announces: “we cannot dispute that its law is so extensive in its
import that it must hold not only for human beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely
under contingent conditions and with exceptions but with absolute necessity” (GMS 4:408).
Since, as discussed, morality is to be grounded in a priori principles, they cannot make reference
to or be derived from anything empirical; this includes, for Kant, any contingent feature of
humanity (including, for instance, facts about desires or the conditions for any individual’s
happiness). Any study of humanity, however, would classify not as metaphysics (a science
beginning from “first principles” or, more simply, fundamental a priori principles), but as
anthropology (an empirical study of humans and human nature as they appear in the world). For
this reason, he sets rational nature as the object of his investigation and at the foundation of
morality. To this effect, he writes: “it is of the greatest practical importance...just because moral
laws are to hold for a rational being as such, to derive them from the universal concept of a
rational being as such” (GMS 4:412). We have, therefore, two bases on which moral laws are to
be derived: the concept of duty (and, as discussed earlier, the concept of a categorical
imperative), and the concept of a “rational being as such” (which, from this point, I will refer to
as simply “rational agency”). I will focus, then, on how the development of these two concepts
in Groundwork II ultimately determines the principles Kant identifies as the formulae of the
Categorical Imperative.
Kant first characterizes rational beings as beings with wills — specifically, beings with
the capacity to act according to principles. The will is the capacity to represent a moral principle
14

and determine the subject to act as a consequence of this representation. To this effect, he
writes: “only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of
laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will” (GMS 4:412). We can distil this claim
to the following one: rational agents act according to principles. I, for instance, can consider
the statement “I should compose a paper about Kant’s Singularity Thesis in order to satisfy a
graduation requirement” and, on the basis of this consideration, compose said paper. A fish, on
the other hand, presumably does not represent to itself a proposition affirming the value of
pursuing food or avoiding hooks; these actions are unprincipled, and thus irrational.
Kant identifies two “parts” of any principle: its object and its form. Since this distinction
plays an important role in his derivation of the formulae, it will be helpful to take a moment to
explain it. Take, for example, my maxim to draft this paper. The object of the principle is easy
to grasp; it is concerned primarily with my desire to graduate (and, by extension, my pursuit of
happiness and my graduation’s role in it) and the means I propose to satisfy this: the objects in
the world I aim to reify (KpV 5:21). Consider now a second maxim: “I should make only those
promises I intend to keep.” This principle, like the last, represents an action as something I must
do — it necessitates the will. However, in doing so, it makes no reference to any subjective
(subject-specific and, consequently empirical) ground of determination. Thus, the determining
ground of the maxim — what supplies it its obligating and ultimately motivating force — could
not be its content, but rather its form: specifically, Kant will argue, its universalizability.
His first task in this section is to identify a proposition which can rightly be called a
categorical imperative. He begins by suggesting an access point: “we want to first inquire
whether the mere concept of a categorical imperative may not also provides its formula
containing the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative” (GMS 4:420). If we can
15

derive a categorical imperative analytically from the concept of a categorical imperative, then, by
extension, this principle would be wholly a priori and ultimately derivable from the mere idea of
moral obligation itself. Recall, the concept of a categorical imperative includes three key
elements: a necessitation of the will by law, the exclusion of subject-specific conditions (and,
thus, the objectivity of law), and determination by the law itself. Thus, any proposition
expressing a categorical imperative could only command an action on the grounds that it meet
these criteria, “for, since the imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the
maxim be in conformity with this law...nothing is left with which the maxim of action is to
conform but the universality of a law as such” (GMS 4:421). A categorical imperative can only
command that a maxim conform to the basic formal requirement for a principle to qualify as a
law: universal applicability. The resulting imperative is FUL: “act only in accordance with that
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (GMS
4:421).
It is a crucial to notice that the starting point for Kant’s derivation of FUL is not only the
concept of a practical law; his argument requires the conception of rational agents as acting from
principles: the representation of laws or imperatives. When Kant derives FUL, his conception of
rational agency is limited to this particular feature of the will. Since Kant explicitly states that
the starting point for any investigation of morality is the concept of a rational being (and, further,
that the applicability of moral laws extends beyond human to all rational beings), the laws he
derives must be informed by his development of this concept. If moral agents were in fact only
beings which represented, and acted according to, imperatives, then the laws governing their
activity would refer only to these imperatives (as opposed to, for instance, the intended
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consequences of the action). Fittingly, then, FUL is a merely formal constraint on how a maxim
ought to be formatted — what a moral principle should look like.
Soon after stating FUL, Kant introduces a new feature of rational agency: end-setting.
He sets up his discussion of ends by re-focusing on the concept of rational agency: the will, and
its capacity to determine action according to principles. To this, he adds: “now, what serves the
will as the objective ground of its self-determination is an end, and this, if it is given by reason
alone, must hold equally for all rational beings” (GMS 4:427). There are two things to unpack
here: the concept of an end, and the concept of an objective end (that is, an end which “[holds]
equally for all rational beings”). The end of a maxim is what Kant calls the “objective ground”:
the thing we wish to achieve with our actions, or the state of the world we wish to bring about.
There is good reason to distinguish between two types of ends: ends as effects, and ends as
interests. Kant characterizes ends as effects as, “the ends that a rational being proposes at his
discretion as effects of his actions (material ends)” (GMS 4:428). In the maxim “I will contribute
to my retirement savings account in order to secure financial stability,” financial stability is an
end as effect; I adopt the maxim in order to make my financial stability exist as an effect of my
actions. This qualification of a type of end immediately suggests another type: one which is not
posited as something I bring about in the world. The only sense in which something can function
as an end for me but not be something I wish to bring about is if the thing already exists. To take
such a thing as an end, then, is to represent it as something I should further, benefit, or contribute
to.13 The vast majority of ends, particularly ends of the former type, rest on subject-specific
conditions. I set “finishing this paper” as an end because I have a desire to earn an M.A. (and
because I know that the existence of the paper is necessary for this to happen). The maxim I
13

I call this an end of interest, but this naming convention is my own.
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adopt with this as my end cannot satisfy Kant’s criteria of a law; since it rests on subjective
empirical conditions, it cannot apply universally to all rational beings. Another type of end is
objectively motivating. These ends are motivating because their object has intrinsic value — not
because of the specific desires of any particular subject.
The Formula of Humanity, FH, rests on the concept of an objective end. If a categorical
imperative were possible, it must (by definition) apply universally. But, as discussed, no maxim
whose objective ground (end) is a subjective end is suitable for universal lawgiving. Thus, any
categorical imperative must presuppose an objective end: an intrinsically valuable object which
is universally motivating for all rational agents (GMS 4:428). Kant asserts that rational nature is
the only thing suitable to play this role.14 From this, he derives FH: “so act that you use
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as
an end, never merely as a means” (GMS 4:429). While FUL is a law expressing the only type of
principle suitable for giving universal law, FH is a law expressing the only end suitable for
giving universal law. Kant employs the same strategy in deriving FH as he does FUL: he applies
the concept of a categorical imperative to a feature of rational agency — a thing that rational
agents do. The difference between his derivations for FUL and FH is, as I have shown, what
feature of rational agency he considers. The difference between the formulate themselves is,
fittingly, the aspect of rational agency for which it sets obligations: FUL, for the capacity to
adopt principles; and FH, for the capacity to set ends. And, since Kant applies FUL and FH to
the same set of four examples with the same set of results, we can clearly see that he intends
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Whether Kant asserts or argues for this claim is debatable. I adopt the former interpretation provisionally, and
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18

these principles to necessitate the same rational agent in the same way with respect to two
different features of his rationality.15
Shortly after considering FH, he considers the two previously established features of
rational agency as a synthetic unity: “the ground of all practical lawgiving lies (in accordance
with the first principle) objectively in the rule and the form of universality which makes it fit to
be a law...subjectively, however, it lies in the end” (GMS 4:431). This unity of objective and
subjective grounds of action — principles and ends, respectively — is what Kant later calls “a
complete determination of all maxims” (GMS 4:436). Kant’s derivation of FA is relatively
straightforward: since the relevant conception of rational agency is a synthesis of the previous
two conceptions, the principle determining its lawful activity is a synthesis of the previous two
formulae. The principles which follows from this consideration is FA: “do no action on any
other maxim than one such that it would be consistent with it to be a universal law, and hence to
act only so that the will could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law through its
maxim” (GMS 4:434). The universality requirement of FUL requires that a practical law be
applicable for all agents, independent of their unique constitutions. The objectivity requirement
of FH requires that a practical law represent rational nature as something of absolute value and
avoid transgressing against the sanctity of human beings as ends in themselves — the “supreme
limiting condition” of my willing, in the sense that my maxims are restricted to those that respect
that which is unconditionally motivating. The only principle which can satisfy both, Kant
concludes, is a principle derived from the will itself — self-legislated. As the above quote
15

While Kant is clear that examples are insufficient for establishing moral principles they are useful for
demonstrating their application — how they work in practice, or what specific duties they prescribe. Kant
considers the same application conditions for FUL and FH, then, to show his readers that FUL and FH are
equivalent in practice — that they set the same duties for any and all rational agents. This also helps the reader to
see more clearly that the differences between FUL and FH are attributable not to a priori grounding of the
principles, but to their particular modes of expression.
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shows, FA is ostensibly the result of a synthesis of two ideas: practical laws of the will in its
formal (principled) and substantive (given by its ends) operation, relying (of course) on the idea
of the will as determined completely — that is, in its synthetic unity.
I hope to have shown two things in this section: (1) that the formulae are each
expressions of the Categorical Imperative, since they are derived from the concept of it and
express the fundamental conditions of lawful determination of action; (2) that the differences
between the formulae are attributable to the various conceptions of rational agency Kant
considers in his derivation of them (and, by extension, the aspects of rational agency they are
supposed to determine).
B. THE SINGULARITY OF THE FORMULAE
Now, having explicated Kant’s derivation of the formulae, I will offer my best attempt at
a clear and convincing statement of the Singularity Thesis. The formulae are each derivable from
the concept of a categorical imperative — a proposition which expresses the necessity of an
action from duty. When we consider this concept as it relates to three concepts of rational
agency — the subjective, objective, and completely determined grounds of action — we can
derive three principles which appear substantially different. However, these principles are
ultimately three expressions of a single law: specifically, the principle Kant identifies as the
supreme principle of morality, “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will
that my maxim should become a universal law” (GMS 4:402). The underlying law — a general
formulation of the Categorical Imperative — expresses merely the formal requirement that a
moral law be universally applicable. We can think about universality, however, in several
different ways. I can, for example, consider my principles themselves and determine whether or
not they are suitable (by virtue of their form) to be universal laws. Additionally, I can consider
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the end of my action and determine whether or not this could possibly serve as a universal
ground for action. The maxim I adopt in order to attain an M.A in philosophy, for example,
could not; since this end has value for me only insofar as I have the particular desire to attain an
M.A in philosophy, it would not be sufficient for determining a universal law. Finally, I can
consider whether the “formulation” or source of my maxim (whether I conceive of it as
externally given or self-given) is consistent with the giving of universal law. Since the
difference between the formulae is merely the access point for our cognition of a single,
underlying law — whether we proceed in moral appraisal by considering the form, end, or
source of our maxim — the formulae are truly singular.
It may help to illustrate the notion of singularity with an example. Consider, for example,
a Kindergarten class with three rules: all students must lie down for a nap at 10 AM; all students
must cease playing and learning at 10 AM; and all students must be silent at 10 AM. We can see
that, in Kant’s own language, the first rule “unites the other two in it;” the demand to nap cannot
be satisfied while playing or while speaking, so the duties it delimits converge with the latter two
rules.16 This set of rules, however, can be contrasted with another: no hoarding classroom
materials all to oneself for any extended period of time, no toys or food may be brought from
home unless they can be made available to the class, and always do your best to ensure that
classmates are not left without materials. Clearly, these three rules are merely three forms —
three ways of expressing — a single one: namely, share. Like the first set, these rules will fix
the same set of duties. Also like the first set, they share a common end — that is, they each serve
to bring about the same thing in the world (napping and sharing, respectively). Unlike the first
set, however, they all share a clear relationship to a common underlying rule: specifically, one
16

This should hold, given a small amount of explanatory legwork, between any one rule and the remaining two.
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demanding that the students share. These three rules set prohibitions against the hoarding of inclass and from-home items, and an obligation to distribute these items equitably. All of these
represent injunctions to share, each with respect to a different aspect of being a Kindergarten
student: participating independently in class, transitioning from home to class, and engaging with
others in class. A student who shares with his classmates helps to ensure equal access to
materials in class. However, we can express an injunction to share in several different ways,
corresponding to the several things that students do. What it means to share with respect to
independent play is to abstain from monopolizing public resources; what it means to share with
respect to coming to class is to abstain from bringing private materials which other students
cannot use; and what it means to share with respect to cooperative play is to avoid situations
where any student or group of student has disproportionate access to materials (we can imagine,
for instance, the unfortunate case of a student forced to work with broken pencils and dried
fingerpaints). Thus, while each rule is different in a certain respect — and, of course, sound like
substantially different rules — we can see how each is simply a way of saying “Share!” It is this
way in which Kant intends the formulae to be singular. Each formula is a way of saying “Act
according only to maxims which are suitable for universal law!” We can think about this
command — with respect to both our moral motivation and our moral appraisal — in three
different ways: as commanding the kind of principles we can adopt (the adoption of our
maxims), as commanding the kind of ends we can set (the objective ground of our maxims), or
as commanding the complete determination of our maxims (the “formulation” of our maxims —
either autonomous or heteronomous). The difference between the three laws is merely in the
perspective from which we consider the underlying law.
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Let me return now to the concern we ended the previous section with. What we must sort
out is how FUL can be a formula of a practical principle which, by all appearances, is precisely
the same principle. To understand this, consider one last time the concept underlying the
derivation of FUL: the idea of rational agents as acting from the representation of principles.
Given that the Categorical Imperative expresses a formal constraint — the unconditional
requirement that any moral principle be universally valid — it follows that the expression of the
Categorical Imperative in solely formal terms (that is, in the application of the Categorical
Imperative to the formal part of rational agency) would be equivalent. Since FUL is the
expression of the Categorical Imperative insofar as it relates to only the capacity of the will to
represent principles, and since only the form of these principles is suitable to determine their
status as moral laws, FUL must in fact state the basic, formal requirements for a moral law. The
latter two formulae (FH and FA), then, express this law in substantive and complete terms
(respectively) if we accept the reading of Kant’s strategy I present above.
One might object that all I have really shown is that what we have called the Formula of
Universal Law is not in fact a formula at all. It makes sense to contend that any two
intensionally identical principles cannot be distinguished in any meaningful way. Thus, one may
claim, my distinction between FUL and the Categorical Imperative is ultimately meaningless
(and perhaps absurd). This objection, however, misrepresents the sense in which I take the
formulae to relate to their underlying law. As discussed, I take each formula to express the
Categorical Imperative as it relates to a difference aspect of rational agency. One way we can
think about this is to rephrase “Formula of…” as “Way of representing the Categorical
Imperative as…” FUL is a way of representing the Categorical Imperative as a law governing
the form of my maxims. When I assess the moral status of my actions — when I hold them up to
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the standard for moral obligation — by considering whether their principles were
universalizable, I have applied the Categorical Imperative through FUL. When I assess the
moral status of my actions by considering whether the objective ground — the end — of my
actions respects unconditionally valuable objects (rational nature, specifically), I have applied
the Categorical Imperative through FH. So, my claim that the Categorical Imperative and FUL
are ultimately identical is ultimately unproblematic. The Categorical Imperative expresses the
fundamental requirements for moral obligation. FUL provides one way of accessing,
representing, or applying this principle. It is no more a “distinct” or “separate” law than FH or
FA. This is precisely what I take Kant to say in the Singularity Thesis.
To further motivate my epistemological reading of the formulae, consider once again
Kant’s own characterization of the formulae. He writes: “it is very useful to bring one and the
same action under the three concepts mentioned above [the formulae] and thereby, as far as
possible, bring it closer to intuition” (GMS 4:437). This passage strongly suggests an epistemic
account of singularity — that the formulae are ways of representing, rather than distinct
instantiations of, the underlying law. Intuition is a mode of epistemic access. Kant’s claim is
that applying all three formulae brings our cognition of the moral law closer to intuition; that is,
that incorporating all three perspectives (where each perspective corresponds to a different
feature of rational agency) into moral appraisal gives us the fullest picture of the moral law and
our conformity or nonconformity to it. Since all three aspects of rational agency are, by
definition,17 united in any rational action, all three perspectives are always available to us; we
can always appraise our actions with any and all of the formulae, and doing so will always lead
to the same moral conclusions.
17

Kant’s development of the concept of rational agency.
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V. THE ANALOGICAL ACCOUNT
In this final section, I will consider my account of the Singularity Thesis alongside Henry
Allison’s Analogical Account. As discussed earlier, Allison makes a uniquely clear statement of
the Singularity Thesis. His analysis of it is perhaps the most thorough attempt at developing an
an account of singularity — what I have done in the two preceding sections. It makes sense,
then, to compare his account to my own. While acknowledging the debt I owe to this account, I
will remark on several ways in which I see mine as an improvement.
In his commentary on the Groundwork, Allison specifically addresses the Singularity
Thesis and explains the relationship between the formulae and the Categorical Imperative in
terms of an analogy. To this effect, he writes, “a similar line of thought is at work in Kant’s
account of the relationship between the categorical imperative and its distinct formulas. The
essential point is that each formula represents the single categorical imperative on the basis of a
different analogy, which supposedly ensures that their differences are subjectively rather than
objectively practical.”18 We should think of “analogy” here, as consistent with Kant’s use of the
term: as, “the manner in which we can legitimately think about supersensible objects, which, ex
hypothesi, cannot be directly cognized.”19 Cognition by analogy is necessary, Kant thinks, when
we lack sensible access to our object of knowledge of investigation. I do not require any
analogy, for instance, to cognize the computer I am typing on; I can experience in space and
time. Since moral laws do not, according to Kant, have empirical content (the Categorical
Imperative determines the form, as opposed to the content, of a possible law), they cannot be
cognized, and thus we have no grounds for making judgements thereon. Rather, reason thinks of
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Allison 2011, 248.
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Allison 2011, 247.
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these laws through the cognition of something else — that is, by analogy.20 According to this
account, then, each formula is a different way of indirectly cognizing the Categorical Imperative.
Consider, for example, FUL. The Categorical Imperative determines the form of a law, but this
by itself provides no determinate law. If, by Allison’s suggestion, we apply this form to some
particular basis for comparison, we can derive the claim that all morally worthy maxims must
have such a form that they can be made into universal laws. This principle is a way of indirectly
cognizing or representing the Categorical Imperative, and its lawgiving authority is derived
therefrom. FH and FA, then, would be two different ways of thinking about the Categorical
Imperative, grounded in two different analogies. Since the formulae, under this interpretation,
represent merely three ways of bringing the Categorical Imperative into experience, the
difference between them would be “merely subjective.”
Another crucial element of Allison’s account, and an intellectual debt I owe to him, is
that which he identifies as the basis for comparison: namely, the three distinct conceptions of
rational agency Kant develops throughout Groundwork II. Each formula, he suggests, represents
the Categorical Imperative on the basis of an analogy with a different aspect of the rational
agent: FUL, with the ability to act from principle; FH, with the ability to set ends; and FA, with a
“complete” view, incorporating the former two capacities. This represents a distinct and
important virtue of Allison’s Analogical Account, since it is sensitive to the context in which the
formulae are derived and to Kant’s strategy in the Groundwork.
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The comparative relationship (characteristic of common uses of “analogy”) in play here is less than clear. Kant is
operating with a technical use of the term, and Allison seems to follow him. The sense of analogy that Allison
seems to be working with is that of a typic, a concept Kant develops in the second Critique. I will discuss this briefly
later.
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While this account makes several critical interpretive points (including, especially, its
emphasis on rational agency), it has two significant drawbacks: first, Allison does not give a
satisfactory or properly fleshed out account of what precisely it means for a principle to represent
a law by analogy; and second, he does not identify the law which the formulae are united under.
The basic idea of the Analogical Account is that the formulae represent the Categorical
Imperative by three different analogies. Thus, to understand the Singularity Thesis under this
interpretation, we must have a firm grip on the operative meaning of “analogy.” While Allison
does suggest the proper reading of “analogy” in the quote above, he also characterizes it (quoting
Kant) as, “perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things.”21 This concept
of analogy (and any concept of analogy) requires a relationship with which to compare that
between the formulae and the law under which they are united. No such analogue, however, can
be found in either Kant’s or Allison’s writing. What Allison does suggest about the nature of
this analogy (that between the formulae and the Categorical Imperative), however, is that “we
have already seen this at work in connection with FUL and FLN (the Formula of Natural
Law).”22 Thus, we are to assume that the sense in which FLN is analogous to FUL is the same as
the sense in which FUL is analogous to the Categorical Imperative. But how, then, does he
characterize this relationship?
Fundamentally, Allison understands the relationship between FUL and FLN as a typic
(or, more precisely, that FLN is a typic of FUL), which Kant himself defines as, “such a law,
however, as can be presented in concreto in objects of the senses and hence a law of nature...this
law is what the understanding can put under an idea of reason on behalf of judgement” (KpV
21
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5:69).23 In brief, FLN is a typic of FUL in the sense that it provides a concrete means of
cognizing and applying a law of freedom in a world governed by laws of nature. FLN, by
incorporating empirical content into the principle expressed by FUL (that is, by exchanging
“universal law” for “universal law of nature”), brings it under the “rules” of experience and
allows us to make judgements thereon. A typic functions similarly to a translation dictionary. A
moral law — the Categorical Imperative, in particular — does not provide any content to be
cognized directly; in this was, it is similar to a proposition stated in an unknown language. Thus,
when agents wish to think about and, most importantly, apply these laws in the world, they
require a way to make the laws accessible and available to use — to translate the law into a
language we can understand and put in practice. A typic, like a translation dictionary, gives us
the means to understand these laws by expressing them in empirical language: to understand a
law about the “universal, lawgiving form” of a practical principle as a law about the suitability of
the law as a law of nature .
It is less than clear how FUL, FH, and FA could be analogies of a single law in this sense.
If we are to understand the formulae’s relationship to the Categorical Imperative as that between
a typic and a law of freedom, we commit ourselves to several things. Most importantly, we must
see the formulae as providing concrete access to the law expressed in the Categorical Imperative.
There is, however, a significant problem with this interpretation. Recall, Allison’s own example
of this relationship is that between FUL and FLN. FLN is a typic of FUL because it provides the
empirical content necessary for incorporating FUL into our judgements; embedded in this claim,
however, is the assumption that FUL does not provide its own empirical content — that it
23

A typic is a species of analogy, which Kant defines as, “this type of cognition is cognition according to analogy,
which surely does not signify, as the word is usually taken, an imperfect similarity between two things, but rather a
perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things” (Prol. 146).
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requires a typic. Thus, if FUL requires a typic — if it is not itself available to us — it cannot
itself be a typic.
One route available to Allison would be to resist this criticism on the grounds that the
relevant formulae here are not FUL, FH, and FA, but rather FLN, FH, and FRE (the Kingdom or
Realm of Ends Formula). These former three can all be seen as typics (Allison himself is unsure
as to how exactly to fit FH into this picture, but let’s grant him this provisionally), so to this
extent the account evades my argument above. However, even if we accept Allison’s claim that
these are the relevant formulae, and thus that we can appropriately describe the formulae as
typics, this would only punt the problem back one level. On this reading, we accept that the
formulae Kant is describing as singular are typics of three laws of freedom: FUL, FH, and FA.
However, since Allison is attempting to explain how the formulae are analogical expressions of a
single law (he is, after all, addressing the Singularity Thesis), he must provide an account on
which these laws are themselves united. If this were not the case, then the formulae could not
properly be described as singular, since they would not be under any single law. This would
render the Singularity Thesis nonsensical. As such, this does not seem to be a viable way of
characterizing the relationship between the formulae and the Categorical Imperative.
The second problem with the Analogical Account is, more basically, that Allison does not
identify that single law which the formulae are united under. It can be assumed, I think, that
absent an explicit answer to this question, we are to take it as simply “the Categorical
Imperative”. However, as I argued above, this is not sufficient for a law in the determinate
sense.
My account, while owing much to Allison’s, represents a significant improvement. Like
the Analogical Account, my account focuses on the role of the concept of rational agency in the
29

derivation and content of the formulae. Since the development of this concept is central to the
argumentation of Groundwork II, and since Kant explicitly announces the importance of this
concept to the identification of a possible moral law, it is a shared virtue of our accounts that
both are informed by its central role in Kant’s argument. Because of this, moreover, our
accounts elucidate Kant’s claim about the difference between the formulae: “There is
nevertheless a difference among them], which is indeed subjectively rather than objectively
practical, intended namely to bring an idea of reason closer to intuition (by a certain analogy)
and thereby to feeling” (GMS 4:436). This is a crucially important point, since it is this
difference which must account for the apparent incompatibility between three principles which
are, ex hypothesi, expressions of the same law. On both of our accounts, the differences between
the formulae are attributable to the relevant conception of rational agency considered in its
derivation and obligated by its imperative; the formulae are all statements of the same law (and
are thus objectively identical), but each is thought relative to a different feature of the will (and
are thus subjectively different).
My account, however, is aimed at addressing the problems I identify with the Analogical
Account. The questions I use to organize my argument (what I have labeled (1) and (2)) are
chosen to corresponding to the two specific objections I press against Allison. First, my account
offers an argument for an identification the selfsame law (the law undergirding the formulae)
(GMS 4:436) with the supreme principle of morality (GMS 4:392). Second, my approach to the
relationship between the formulae and the selfsame law — relying (like Allison) on the concept
of rational agency while abandoning the concept of analogy — ameliorates the deep tension in
Allison’s use and understanding of “analogy”. To help illustrate this briefly, recall that Allison’s
account dealt only provisionally with FH because of an incompatibility between it and the notion
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of a typic. Since my account is not reliant on this idea, and instead focuses only on the feature of
the will considered when we cognize the moral law, I avoid this problem.

VI. CONCLUSION
To this point, there is a dearth of literature dealing specifically with The Singularity
Thesis. In many places, it is either assumed, overlooked, or conflated with another idea (most
commonly the Equivalence Thesis). In this paper, I brought this idea to the forefront and
attempted to provide a convincing interpretation which is consistent with Kant’s arguments in
the Groundwork. The Singularity Thesis is, I believe, central to the goal of the Groundwork. The
formulae express three distinct principles which determine duty — specifically prohibitive duties
— in subjectively different ways. In addition, competent moral appraisal seems to require
mastery of each formula — including, importantly, an appreciation of their subjective difference.
Thus, it is crucial that we retain the distinction between them. However, it is equally crucial for
the internal consistency of Kant’s project that the three formulae can in fact be singularly
identified with the Categorical Imperative. As such, it is an important task to provide an account
of the Singularity Thesis which is intelligible and consistent with his presentation and derivation
of it. In doing so, we preserve the aforementioned elements of Kant’s moral philosophy while
remaining faithful to his intentions. I hope to have provided such an account, and to have
demonstrated two things: 1) that the formulae can be said to be singular in the sense that they
each express the supreme principle of morality (roughly equivalent to the Fundamental Law of
Pure Practical Reason) insofar as it is applied to and determining of/necessitating for three
distinct aspects of rational agency, and 2) that, although my account is in some respects a
development of the ideas Allison presents in the Analogical Account, it ultimately represents an
improvement in terms of clarity and precision.
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